AMERICAN SENTINEL

"IF ANY MAN HEAR MY WORDS, AND BELIEVE NOT, I JUDGE HIM NOT."—Jesus Christ.

ALONZO T. JONES, EDITOR.

NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 11, 1897.

VOL. 12, No. 6. Single Copy, 3 cents.



ABRAHAM LINCOLN



STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS

"I INSIST that if there is anything which it is the duty of the whole people to never intrust to any hands but their own, that thing is the preservation and perpetuity of their own liberties and institutions."—*Abraham Lincoln.*

FEBRUARY 12 is the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.

Throughout the country on that day there will be held meetings, dinners, etc., at which many speeches will be made in honor of that man in whom were mingled so many of the elements of true greatness.

The AMERICAN SENTINEL heartily joins in the tribute of honor to the memory of Abraham Lincoln. We propose to honor him by honoring the principles to which he was so thoroughly devoted. And that this may be done in the best way, we give to him space in our columns to speak again in behalf of the great principles which called forth the highest efforts of his great powers.

Nor is this done merely as a tribute to his memory. It needs to be done again; because again the principle is attacked, to the advocacy of which he gave the best years of his life, and which he caused to triumph.

In principle, the situation to-day is precisely what it was in 1857–1860. And the position which Abraham

Lincoln occupied with reference to the situation as it was in his day needs to be recalled for the instruction of all the people respecting the situation as it is to-day.

The one great governmental principle to which Abraham Lincoln devoted his mighty energies from 1857 to 1861, is THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO APPEAL FROM, AND TO REVERSE, DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES UPON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

This principle was denounced at that time as *revolutionary*. For advocating this principle, Abraham Lincoln was denounced as preaching "monstrous revolutionary doctrine"; as being an enemy of the Constitution and the supremacy of the laws; as giving over the country to violence, to anarchy, to the rule of the mob.

In 1896, this identical principle, with all who advocated it, was denounced in the same way and in the same words. And it was done by men who profess to be not only admirers of Abraham Lincoln, but the very conservators of the principles maintained by him.

Perhaps these same men, on this Lincoln birthday occasion, will again contradict themselves and falsify history, by attempting to honor Lincoln in speech, while both in speech and action they repudiate his principles. We want the readers of the AMERICAN SENTINEL to be prepared to put into the hands of those men, and all to whom those men may speak, Lincoln's own discussion of the principle which he so devotedly maintained.

IN the month of March, 1857, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered a decision on the slavery question, in which the court gave to the Constitution a certain interpretation. The occasion of the decision is of no particular interest to-day; but the governmental principle developed upon the rendering of the decision is of vital interest always to the whole people of the United States.

No sooner had the decision been published than throughout the whole country there was a taking of sides for and against it. From whatever cause, it was but a little while before it was found that United States Senator Stephen A. Douglas and Abraham Lincoln stood distinctly in the place of leaders of the respective sides to the controversy—Douglas for the decision, Lincoln against it.

DOUGLAS AND LINCOLN AT SPRINGFIELD, ILL.

The position and argument of those who accepted the decision of the court were stated by Senator Douglas at Springfield, Ill., about the second week of June, 1857, as follows:—

"The courts are the tribunals prescribed by the Constitution and created by the authority of the people to determine, expound, and enforce the law. Hence, whoever resists the final decision of the highest judicial tribunal, aims a deadly blow at our whole republican system of government—a blow which, if successful, would place all our rights and liberties at the mercy of passion, anarchy and violence. I repeat, therefore, that if resistance to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in a matter like the points decided in the Dred Scott case, clearly within their jurisdiction as defined by the Constitution, shall be forced upon the country as a political issue, it will become a distinct and naked issue between the friends and enemies of the Constitution—the friends and the enemies of the supremacy of the laws."

In a speech at Springfield, "two weeks" later, June 26, 1857, Lincoln replied to this, as follows:—

"And now as to the Dred Scott decision. . . . Judge Douglas . . . denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him?

"Judicial decisions have two uses—first, to absolutely determine the case decided; and, secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they arise. For the latter use they are called 'precedents' and 'authorities.'

"We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to, and respect for, the judicial department of the Government. . . . But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it, has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it overrule this. We offer no resistance to it.

Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profession.

"If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges; and without any apparent partisan bias; and in accordance with legal public expectation; and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history; and had been, in no part, based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years; it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not to acquiesce in it as a precedent.

"But when, as it is true, we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, *it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country.* But Judge Douglas considers this view awful."

AT CHICAGO.

In 1858 Lincoln and Douglas were rival candidates for the United States senatorship; and this supreme court decision was the leading issue. Friday evening, July 9, Senator Douglas made a speech in Chicago, in which, noticing Lincoln's speech upon his nomination for senator, he said:—

"The other proposition discussed by Mr. Lincoln in his speech, consists in a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States on account of the Dred Scott decision. On this question also I desire to say to you unequivocally, that I take direct and distinct issue with him. I have no warfare to make on the Supreme Court of the United States, either on account of that or any other decision which they have pronounced from that bench.

"The Constitution of the United States has provided that the powers of government (and the constitution of each State has the same provision) shall be divided into three departments—Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. The right and the province of expounding the Constitution and construing the law are vested in the judiciary established by the Constitution.

"As a lawyer, I feel at liberty to appear before the court and controvert any principle of law while the question is pending before the tribunal; but when the decision is made, my private opinion, your opinion, all other opinions, must yield to the majesty of that authoritative adjudication.

"I wish you to bear in mind that this involves a great principle, upon which our rights, our liberty, and our property all depend. What security have you for your property, for your reputation, and for your personal rights, if the courts are not upheld, and their decisions respected when once fairly rendered by the highest tribunal known to the Constitution?

"I do not choose, therefore, to go into any argument with Mr. Lincoln in reviewing the various decisions which the Supreme Court has made, either upon the Dred Scott case or any other. I have no idea of appealing from the decision of the Supreme Court upon a constitutional question to the decisions of a tumultuous town meeting.

"I am aware that once an eminent lawyer of this city, now no more, said that the State of Illinois had the most perfect judicial system in the world, subject to but one exception, which could be cured by a slight amendment, and that amendment was to so change the law as to allow an appeal from the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, on all constitutional questions, to justices of he peace.

"My friend, Mr. Lincoln, who sits behind me, reminds me that that proposition was made when I was judge of the Supreme Court. Be that as it may, I do not think that fact adds any greater weight or authority to the suggestion. It matters not with me who was on the bench, whether Mr. Lincoln or myself, whether a Lockwood or a Smith, a Taney or a Marshall; the decision of the highest tribunal known to the Constitution of the country must be final till it is reversed by an equally high authority.

"Hence, I am opposed to this doctrine of Mr. Lincoln by which he proposes to take an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon this high constitutional question, to a Republican caucus sitting in the country. Yes, or any other caucus or town meeting, whether it be Republican, American, or Democratic. I respect the decisions of that august tribunal. I shall always bow in deference to them. I am a law-abiding man."

The next night, July 10, 1858, Lincoln spoke in reply, and upon this point said:—

"Another of the issues he says that is to be made with me is upon his devotion to the Dred Scott decision, and my opposition to it.

"I have expressed heretofore, and I now repeat my opposition to the Dred Scott decision; but I should be allowed to state the nature of that opposition, and I ask your indulgence while I do so.

"What is fairly implied by the term Judge Douglas has used, 'resistance to the decision'? I do not resist it. If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with property, and that terrible difficulty that Judge Douglas speaks of, of interfering with property, would arise. But I am doing no such thing as that; but all that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of the Dred Scott decision I would vote that it should.

"That is what I should do. Judge Douglas said last night that before the decision he might advance his opinion, and it might be contrary to the decision when it was made, but after it was made, he would abide by it until it was reversed. Just so! We let this property abide by the decision, but WE WILL TRY TO REVERSE THAT DECISION. We will try to put it where Judge Douglas would not object, for he says he will obey it until it is reversed. SOMEBODY HAS TO REVERSE THAT DECISION, since it was made, and WE MEAN TO REVERSE IT, and we mean to do it peaceably.

"What are the uses of decisions of courts?—They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First, they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave; nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands, are as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person, it will be so decided again, unless the court decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. Well, *we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way.* This is one thing we mean to try to do.

"The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision is a degree of sacredness that has never been before thrown around any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. Why, decisions apparently contrary to that decision, or that good lawyers thought were contrary to that decision, have been made by that very court before. It is the first of its kind; it is an astonisher in legal history; it is a new wonder of the world.

"It is based upon falsehood in the main as to facts; allegations of facts upon which it stands are not facts at all in many instances, and no decision made on any question—the first instance of a decision made under so many unfavorable circumstances—thus placed, has ever been held by the profession as law, and it has always needed confirmation before the lawyers regarded it as settled law.

"But Judge Douglas will have it that all hands must take this extraordinary decision, made under these extraordinary circumstances, and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it, yield to it, and obey it in every possible sense."

DOUGLAS AT BLOOMINGTON.

Again: In a speech at Bloomington, Illinois, July 16, 1858, Senator Douglas said:—

"I therefore take issue with Mr. Lincoln directly in regard to this warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States. I accept the decision of that court as it was pronounced. Whatever my individual opinions may

be, I, as a good citizen, am bound by the laws of the land as the legislature makes them, as the court expounds them, and as the executive officer administers them. I am bound by our Constitution as our fathers made it, and as it is our duty to support it. I am bound as a good citizen to sustain the constituted authorities, and to resist, discourage, and beat down, by all lawful and peaceful means, all attempts at exciting mobs, or violence, or any other revolutionary proceedings, against the Constitution and the constituted authorities of the country."

LINCOLN SUSTAINED BY AUTHORITY.

The next night, July 17, at Springfield, Lincoln replied and said:—

"Now as to the Dred Scott decision, for upon that he makes his last point at me. He boldly takes ground in favor of that decision.

"This is one-half the onslaught, and one-third of the plan, of the entire campaign. I am opposed to that decision in a certain sense, but not in the sense which he puts on it. I say that in so far as it decided in favor of Dred Scott's master, and against Dred Scott and his family, I do not propose to disturb or resist the decision.

"I never have proposed to do any such thing. I think that in respect for judicial authority my humble history would nor suffer in comparison with that of Judge Douglas.

"He would have the citizen conform his vote to that decision; the member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power. He would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of the Government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs.

"When he spoke at Chicago, on Friday evening of last week, he made this same point upon me. On Saturday evening I replied, and reminded him of a Supreme Court decision which he opposed for at least several years. Last night, at Bloomington, he took some notice of that reply, but entirely forgot to remember that part of it.

"He renews his onslaught upon me, forgetting to remember that I have turned the tables against himself on that very point. I renew the effort to draw his attention to it. I wish to stand erect before the country, as well as Judge Douglas, *on this question of judicial authority;* and therefore I add something to the authority in favor of my own position. *I wish to show that I am sustained by authority*, in addition to that heretofore presented. . . .

"In public speaking it is tedious reading from documents; but I must beg to indulge the practice to a limited extent. *I shall read from a letter written by Mr. Jefferson in 1820*, and now to be found in the seventh volume of his correspondence, at page 177. It seems he had been presented by a gentleman of the name of Jarvis with a book, or essay, or periodical, called the 'Republican,' and he was writing in acknowledgment of the present, and noting some of its contents. After expressing the hope that the work will produce a favorable effect upon the minds of the young, he proceeds to say:—

"'That it will have this tendency may be expected, and for that reason I feel an urgency to note what I deem an error in it, the more requiring notice as your opinion is strengthened by that of many others. *You seem*, in pages 84 and 148, *to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions,—a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps.* Their maxim is, "*Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem;*" *and their power is the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that, to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots.* It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves.'

"*Thus we see the power claimed for the Supreme Court by Judge Douglas, Mr. Jefferson holds, would reduce us to the despotism of an oligarchy.*

"Now, I have said no more than this,—in fact, never quite so much as this; at least I am sustained by Mr. Jefferson.

"Let us go a little further. You remember we once had a National Bank. Some one owed the bank a debt; he was sued, and sought to avoid payment on the ground that the bank was unconstitutional. The case went to the Supreme Court, and therein it was decided that the bank was constitutional. *The whole Democratic party revolted against that decision. General Jackson himself asserted that he, as President, would not be bound to hold a National Bank to be constitutional, even though the court had decided it to be so. He fell in precisely with the view of Mr. Jefferson, and acted upon it under his official oath, in vetoing a charter for a National Bank.*

The declaration that Congress does not possess this constitutional power to charter a bank has gone into the Democratic platform, at their national conventions, and was brought forward and reaffirmed in their last convention at Cincinnati. They have contended for that declaration, in the very teeth of the Supreme Court, for more than a quarter of a century. *In fact, they have reduced the decision to an absolute nullity.*

"*That decision, I repeat, is repudiated in the Cincinnati platform; and still, as if to show that effrontery can go no farther, Judge Douglas vaunts in the very speeches in which he denounces me for opposing the Dred Scott decision that he stands on the Cincinnati platform.*

"Now, I wish to know what the judge can charge upon me, with respect to the decisions of the Supreme Court, which does not lie in all its length, breadth, and proportions at his own door. . . .

"*Free men of Sangamon, free men of Illinois, free men everywhere, judge ye between him and me upon this issue.*"

THE FAMOUS DEBATE.

Shortly after the foregoing speech at Springfield, arrangements were made, and the famous debate between Lincoln and Douglas, was entered into. The first discussion was at Ottawa, August 21, 1858. Upon this question, Mr. Douglas said nothing; but Lincoln spoke as follows:—

"Let us see what influence he [Judge Douglas] is exerting on public sentiment. In this and like communities, *public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.*

"This must be borne in mind, as also the additional fact that Judge Douglas is a man of vast influence, so great that it is enough for many men to profess to believe anything, when they once find out that Judge Douglas professes to believe it. Consider also the attitude he occupies at the head of a large party,—a party which he claims has a majority of all the voters in the country.

"This man sticks to a decision . . . not because he says it is right in itself,—he does not give any opinion on that,—but because it has been decided by the court; and being decided by the court, he is, and you are, bound to take it in your political action as law, not that he judges at all of its merits, but because a decision of the court is to him a 'Thus saith the Lord.'

"He places it on that ground alone; and you will bear in mind that thus committing himself unreservedly to this decision commits him to the next one just as firmly as to this. He did not commit himself on account of the merit or demerit of the decision, but it is a 'Thus saith the Lord.' The next decision, as much as this, will be a 'Thus saith the Lord.'

There is nothing that can divert or turn him away from this decision. It is nothing that I point out to him that his great prototype, General Jackson, did not believe in the binding force of decisions. It is nothing to him that Jefferson did not so believe.

"I have said that I have often heard him approve of Jackson's course in disregarding the decision of the Supreme Court pronouncing a National Bank constitutional. He says, I did not hear him say so. He denies the accuracy of my recollection. I say he ought to know better than I, but I will make no question about this thing, though it still seems to me that I heard him say it twenty times.

"I will tell him, though, that he now claims to stand on the Cincinnati platform, which affirms that Congress *cannot* charter a National Bank, in the teeth of that old standing decision that Congress *can* charter a bank."



LINCOLN SPEAKING AT GALESBURG, ILL. [*From McClure's Magazine.*]

LINCOLN AT GALESBURG, ILL.

The next place at which the subject of the nature of Supreme Court decisions was discussed was Galesburg, October 7, 1858. There, on this point, Lincoln spoke as follows:—

"I have turned his [Judge Douglas's] attention to the fact that General Jackson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. I have asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision.

"Jefferson said that 'Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so.' And he said, substantially, that 'whenever a free people should give up in absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their liberties were gone.'

"I have asked his attention to the fact that the Cin-

cinnati platform upon which he says he stands, disregards a time-honored decision of the Supreme Court, in denying the power of Congress to establish a National Bank. . . .

"So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he swells himself up and says, 'All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you fellows that dare question it in any way, are the enemies of the Constitution.' Now, in this very devoted adherence to this decision in opposition to all the great political leaders whom he has recognized as leaders, in opposition to his former self and history, there is something very marked.

"And the manner in which he adheres to it,—not as being right upon the merits, as he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being absolutely obligatory upon every one, simply because of the source from whence it comes,—as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may be; this is another marked feature of his adherence to that decision.

"It marks it in this respect that it commits him to the next decision whenever it comes, as being as obligatory as this one, since he does not investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong. So he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong. He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to take the next decision when it comes, without any inquiry."

AT QUINCY.

At Quincy, Ill., October 13, 1858, Mr. Lincoln said:—

"We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by that court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free.

"We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by the court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled: but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong; which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision.

"We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way because we think it lays the foundation, not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States themselves.

"We propose so resisting it *as to have it reversed if we can*, and A NEW JUDICIAL RULE ESTABLISHED UPON THIS SUBJECT."

To this and Lincoln's position altogether, on this subject, Judge Douglas on the same occasion replied as follows:—

"He tells you that he does not like the Dred Scott decision. Suppose he does not; how is he going to help himself? He says he will reverse it. How will he reverse it? I know of but one mode of reversing judicial decisions, and that is by appealing from the inferior to the superior court. But I have never yet learned how or where an appeal could be taken from the Supreme Court of the United States! The Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the highest tribunal on earth. From that decision there is no appeal this side of heaven."

And to this Lincoln responded:—

"But he is desirous of knowing how we are going to reverse the Dred Scott decision. Judge Douglas ought to know how.

"Did not he and his political friends find a way to reverse the decision of that same court in favor of the constitutionality of the National Bank? Didn't they find a way to do it so effectually that they have reversed it as completely as any decision ever was reversed, so far as its practical operation is concerned?

"And let me ask you didn't Judge Douglas find a way to reverse the decision of our Supreme Court when it decided that Carlin's father—old Governor Carlin—had not the constitutional power to remove a Secretary of State? Did he not appeal to the 'MOBS,' as he calls them? Did he not make speeches in the lobby to show how villainous that decision was, and how it ought to be overthrown? Did he not succeed, too, in getting an act passed by the legislature to have it overthrown? And didn't he himself sit down on that bench as one of the five added judges, who were to overslaugh the four old ones,—getting his name of 'Judge' in that way, and no other? If there is a villainy in using disrespect or making opposition to Supreme Court decisions, I commend it to Judge Douglas's earnest consideration."

AT COLUMBUS.

At Columbus, Ohio, September 16, 1859, Lincoln spoke the following suggestive words:—

"I wish to say something now in regard to the Dred Scott decision. . . . I undertake to give the opinion, at least, that if the Territories attempt by any direct legislation to drive the man with his slave out of the Territory, or to decide that his slave is free because of his being taken in there, or to tax him to such an extent that he cannot keep him there, the Supreme Court will unhesitatingly decide all such legislation unconstitutional, *as long as that Supreme Court is constructed* as the Dred Scott Supreme Court is. . . .

"In my judgement there is no avoiding the result, save that the American people shall see that constitutions are better construed than our Constitution is construed in that decision. They must take care that it is more faithfully and truly carried out, than it is there expounded."

AT CINCINNATI.

The very next day—September 17, 1859—at Cincinnati, he also proclaimed the following all-important truth:—

"THE PEOPLE OF THESE UNITED STATES ARE THE RIGHTFUL MASTERS OF BOTH CONGRESSES AND COURTS: NOT TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTION; BUT TO OVERTHROW THE MEN WHO PERVERT THE CONSTITUTION."

AT THE NATION'S CAPITOL.

At the Capitol of the nation, March 4, 1861, when about to take the oath of office as President of the United States, in his inaugural address, and as the final word in a discussion which brought him to the headship of the nation, Lincoln again stated the principle, as follows:—

"I do not forget the position assumed by some that Constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that *such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit*, while they are also entitled to a very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government. And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, *being limited to that particular case*, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice.

"At the same time, *the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, as in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers*, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.

"*Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges.*"

LINCOLN'S PRINCIPLE AGAIN REPUDIATED.

Thus from beginning to end of a discussion and campaign continuing for four years, Abraham Lincoln steadfastly and courageously proclaimed the governmental principle of the right of the people of the United States to call in question, to sit in judgment upon, and to reverse, a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States touching the meaning of the Constitution.

To his position as to the principle he was able to bring the weighty authority of Thomas Jefferson—"the author of the Declaration of Independence, and otherwise a chief actor in the Revolution; then a delegate in Congress; afterward, twice President; who was, is, and perhaps will continue to be, the most distinguished politician of our history."

In addition to this he was able to bring to his support the national precedent of President Jackson and the great party of which he was the leader; and even the precedent of Senator Douglas himself, his own chief opponent.

And beyond this, he was sustained in his position by the overwhelming voice of the whole nation, in making him President, as the result of a campaign in which this was the chief issue.

Yet in the face of all this, in 1896 such prominent men as Benjamin Harrison, Chauncey M. Depew, and Bourke Cochran, denounced as revolutionary a resolution embodying the identical principle for which Abraham Lincoln contended and which he sustained by national authority and national precedent.

A SERIES OF STULTIFICATIONS.

And as though to illustrate how completely a man of national prominence can stultify himself, the plainest history, and even his hero, Mr. Depew, in delivering an oration in "honor" of Abraham Lincoln, at Galesburg, Ill., October 7, 1896, on the very spot where Lincoln spoke twenty-eight years before, attempted to divorce Abraham Lincoln from the principle which he unswervingly maintained, and to commit him to a view that he never even referred to but once in the whole four years' record, and then only to show that it did not apply. Mr. Depew said:—

"If the court interpreted the Constitution against his judgment and conscience, he would bow to its opinion, but agitate to so amend the charter as to clearly establish liberty in that instrument."

All that any one needs to do to see how entirely Lincoln is misrepresented in this statement by Mr. Depew, is simply to glance again at the words of Lincoln as printed in the foregoing columns. We have printed all that has been preserved of what he said on that subject from beginning to end. And in it all, there is not a single sentence to justify Mr. Depew's statement.

The interpretation of the Constitution by the Court, was against his judgment and conscience. But he *did not* "bow to its opinion." He distinctly said that he did not, and that he would not. He distinctly said that if he were in Congress and a vote should come up on a question whether Congress could do what the Court said it could not do, "in spite of the Dred Scott decision" he would vote that it could. He distinctly said "refuse to obey it as a political rule." "We oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, on the members of Congress, or the President;" "We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule."

If that indicates the attitude of one who bows to the opinion of the court in interpreting the Constitution, then we should like very much to have Mr. Depew's definition of the attitude of a man who refused to bow to such an opinion.

Nor is Mr. Depew any more fortunate in his statement that Lincoln would "agitate to amend the Constitution," etc. The plain truth is that in the whole four years' discussion and agitation on this subject by Abraham Lincoln there is not to be found a single sentence that can be construed into an agitation to amend the Constitution as a remedy for the decision which he opposed.

From beginning to end his agitation was solely, his call was only, "Reverse that decision." "Somebody has to reverse that decision, since it was made, and we mean to reverse it." "We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and [not an amendment to the Constitution, but] A NEW JUDICIAL RULE *established on this subject.*" "The American people shall see that constitutions are [not amended, but] *better construed* than our Constitution is construed in that decision."

These are not the words of a man who was agitating for an amendment to the Constitution as a remedy for an interpretation of it that was against his judgment and conscience. Abraham Lincoln was too well acquainted with the fundamental principles of t

ment of the United States, and had too much respect for the liberties of the people, to pursue a course that would "establish the despotism of an oligarchy."

As certainly therefore as Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson, were right, so certainly Benjamin Harrison, Chauncey M. Depew, and Bourke Cochran, are wrong. If, however, it shall be insisted by anybody that Harrison, Depew, and Cochran, are right, then it will have to be claimed that Lincoln, Jefferson, and Jackson, were wrong: and in that case a new set of principles will have to be recognized, which will develop shortly a different order of government from that established by the fathers and maintained by Lincoln—an order of government that will not be "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Were Lincoln alive he might well exclaim again: "Free men everywhere; judge ye between *them* and me upon this issue."

Additional Authorities.

There are yet other important authorities that are worth recalling in this connection, in order that the reader may have as nearly as possible a complete presentation of this important subject—especially in view of the fact that some of the most prominent men in the country seem to have forgotten it all.

First, there is the authority of one of the makers of the Constitution—John Dickinson—in a pamphlet of 1788, on "The Federal Constitution." He said:—

"It must be granted that a bad administration may take place. What is then to be done?—The answer is instantly found: Let the Fasces be lowered before—*the supreme sovereignty of the people.* It is their duty to watch, and their right to take care, that the Constitution be preserved, or, in the Roman phrase on perilous occasions—to provide that the Republic receive no damage."

"When one part [of the Government], without being sufficiently checked by the rest, abuses its power to the manifest danger of public happiness; or when the several parts abuse their respective powers so as to involve the commonwealth in the like peril; *the people* must restore things to that order from which their functionaries have departed. If *the people* suffer this living principle of watchfulness and control to be extinguished among them, they will assuredly not long afterwards, experience that of *their* 'temple' 'there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.' "

Further, we have the authority of George Bancroft, the historian of the Constitution. In his work, "The History of the Formation of the Constitution," discussing the "Federal Judiciary," he makes the following statement concerning the Supreme Court, which is also but an extension of the principles laid down by Alexander Hamilton in his discussion of the Judiciary in the *Federalist, No. LXXVIII:*—

"The Supreme Court was to be the 'bulwark of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments.' ["Federalist," LXXVIII.] A bench of a few, selected with care by the President and Senate of the nation, seemed a safer tribunal than a multitudinous assembly elected for a short period under the sway of passing currents of thought, or the intrepid fixedness of an uncompromising party. There always remains danger of erroneous judgments, arising from mistakes, imperfect investigation, the bias of previous connections, the seductions of ambition, or the instigations of surrounding opinions, and *a court from which there is no appeal* is apt to forget circumspection in its sense of security.

"The passage of a judge from the bar to the bench does not necessarily divest him of prejudices, nor chill his relations to the particular political party to which he may owe his advancement, nor blot out of his memory the great interests which he may have professionally piloted through doubtful straits, nor quiet the ambition which he is not required to renounce, even though his appointment is for life, nor cure predelictions which sometimes have their seat in his inmost nature.

"But the Constitution retains the means of protecting itself against the errors of partial or interested judgments. In the first place, the force of a judicial opinion of the Supreme Court, in so far as it is irreversible, reaches only the particular case in dispute; and to this society submits, in order to escape from anarchy in the daily routine of business.

"To the decison on an underlying question of constitutional law no such finality attaches. To endure, it must be right. If it is right, it will approve itself to the universal sense of the impartial. A judge who can justly lay claim to integrity will never lay claim to infallibility, but with indefatigable research will add, retract, and correct, whenever more mature consideration shows the need of it. The court is itself inferior and subordinate to the Constitution; it has only a delegated authority, and every opinion contrary to the tenor of its commission is void, except as settling the case on trial.

"The prior act of a superior must be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior, otherwise it might transform the limited into an unlimited constitution. When laws clash, the latest law is rightly held to express the corrected will of the Legislature; but the Constitution is the fundamental code, the law of laws; and where there is a conflict between the Constitution and a decision of the court, the original permanent act of the superior outweighs the later act of the inferior, and retains its own supreme energy unaltered and unalterable except in the manner prescribed by the Constitution itself.

"To say that a court, having once discovered an error, should yet cling to it because it has once been delivered as its opinion, is to invest caprice with inviolability and make a wrong judgment of a servant outweigh the Constitution to which he has sworn obedience. An act of the Legislature at variance with the Constitution is pronounced void; an opinion of the Supreme Court at variance with the Constitution is equally so."

This passage is worthy of more extended notice.

(*a*) "The Supreme Court was to be the bulwark against legislative encroachments" upon the rights of the people. This was the purpose of the founders of that tribunal. But did the people erect no bulwark against

judicial encroachments? Or did they suppose that supreme judges were so decidedly infallible that there was no possibility of their encroaching even unconsciously? Did they think it impossible for that Court to make a mistake?—Nothing of the kind. They knew that even supreme judges, being only men, are just like other men, having the same weaknesses and the same liablility to mistakes as other men, and therefore being as liable as legislators to mistake the meaning of the Constitution and to encroach upon the rights of the people. And knowing that "a court from which there is no appeal is apt to forget circumspection in its sense of security," and is thereby only the more apt to make mistakes and encroachments, the people, while setting the Supreme Court as the bulwark against legislative encroachments, retained to themselves the right of final appeal, judgment and decision upon the decisions of the court touching all questions of the Constitution.

LINCOLN'S MONUMENT, SPRINGFIELD, ILL.

(*b*) "Where there is a conflict between the Constitution and a decision of the court," etc. But if every decision of the Supreme Court is final in all respects; and if said decisions are to be accepted as final as to the meaning of the Constitution; then it would be impossible that there ever could be any such thing as a conflict between the Constitution and a decision of the Court.

Yet, as it is expressly declared in the Constitution that the people have reserved certain rights and powers exclusively to themselves, and so have forbidden the Supreme Court any jurisdiction in these, it is clearly possible for a conflict to be made between the Constitution and a decision of the Court. And where there is a conflict there must of necessity be some authority to decide. And as the people made both the Constitution and the Court; and as the people stand outside of and above both the Constitution and the Court; it is perfectly plain that in all cases of conflict between the Constitution and the Supreme Court, the right of final judgment and decision lies with the people as an inalienable right.

(*c*) The court "has only a delegated authority, and every opinion contrary to the tenor of its commission is void." But if every decision of the court is to be accepted as final in all respects, how would it be possible for any opinion ever to be void? And even though it were possible, how could the fact of its being void ever be discovered? It is true that the court has only a delegated authority, and that every opinion contrary to the tenor of its commission, that is, every opinion contrary to the tenor of the Constitution, is void. And it is equally true that it lies with the people, who delegated this authority, to discover and to disregard and set aside as void every such opinion. And this prerogative lies with the people as their inalienable right.

(*d*) "An act of the Legislature at variance with the Constitution is pronounced void. An opinion of the Supreme Court at variance with the Constitution is equally so." An act of the Legislature at variance with the Constitution is pronounce void by the Supreme Court. But when an opinion of the Supreme Court is at variance with the Constitution, whose prerogative is it to pronounce this void and to treat it so?—Clearly this is the prerogative and right of the people.

It is here said, and repeated, that every such opinion

of the court "is void." This is true; and if such decisions were completely ignored by everybody, and so left meaningless and void as they are, they could never do any harm. But it is hardly possible that there could ever be a decision in which nobody would have sufficient personal interest to seek to make it of force as far as possible; and every decision, void or otherwise, always stands as a matter of record to be taken up by interested parties and used as a precedent upon which to carry any principle involved, to its fullest extent in real factitive law. For this reason it is incumbent upon the people to see that every such decision is so positively pronounced void, and so regarded by themselves—the supreme and ultimate authority—that it shall not be cited even as a precedent.

There is another excellent statement of this principle, which, though not bearing exactly the force of national authority, is well worthy to be set down here. It is in every respect true, and shows how this subject presents itself to a disinterested mind. Mr. Bryce, in his great work, "The American Commonwealth," speaks thus:—

"How and by whom, in case of dispute, is the validity or invalidity of a statute to be determined?—Such determination is to be effected by setting the statute side by side with the Constitution, and considering whether there is a discrepancy between them. Is the purpose of the statute one of the purposes mentioned or implied in the Constitution? Does it in pursuing that purpose contain anything which violates any clause of the Constitution? Sometimes this is a simple question which an intelligent layman may answer; more frequently it is a difficult one, which needs not only the subtlety of a trained lawyer, but a knowledge of former cases which have thrown light on the same or a similar point. In any event it is an important question, whose solution ought to proceed from a weighty authority. It is a question of interpretation, that is, of determining the true meaning both of the superior law [the Constitution] and of the inferior law [the statute], so as to discoves whether they are inconsistent. Now the interpretation of laws belongs to courts of justice."

"How is the interpreting authority restrained? If the American Constitution is capable of being so developed by this expansive interpretation, what security do its written terms offer to the people and to the States? . . . There stands above and behind the Legislature, the executive, *and the judiciary*, ANOTHER POWER, that of public opinion. The President, Congress, and the courts are all, the two former directly, the latter practically, amenable to the people. . . . If the people approve the way in which these authorities are interpreting and using the Constitution, they go on; if the people disapprove, they pause, or at least slacken their pace. . . . The people have, of course, much less exact notions of the Constitution than the legal profession or the courts. But . . . they are sufficiently attached to its general doctrines, they sufficiently prize the protection it affords them against their own impulses, to censure any interpretation which palpably departs from the old lines."

And upon all this it is well to bear in mind, and proper ever to say, that "there is not in this view any assault upon the court or the judges." It is simply maintaining the fundamental principle of the Government of the United States, and the vital principle of the rights of the people.

Nor is this to say, nor in any sense to imply, that every man is at liberty to disregard, or disrespect, whatever decision of the court he may not personally agree with. It is to say that it is absolutely incumbent on every citizen to be so well read in the Constitution that he shall know for himself the limitations upon the Government, and shall know how to act accordingly. Every citizen must hold himself, as well as the court, and the Government, altogether, strictly to the Constitution.

The Present Practical Bearing of this Discussion.

THIS discussion would be well worth all the space that is given to it in these columns, even though there were nothing more to it than the calling of the minds of the people anew to a vital principle of their government that is almost wholly forgotten.

But this is not all there is to this matter. The question has a present practical bearing, that is of the greatest importance to all the people of the nation. In 1892, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its opinion that the first amendment to the Constitution has one language and one meaning with organic acts whose object was "the establishment of the Christian religion;" and that therefore the meaning of the Constitution is that "this is a Christian nation."

This decision has been seized upon, and has been pushed ever since, by the combined religious elements of the country as authority for demanding that religious customs, rites, and dogmas shall be recognized and enforced in the legislation and the actions generally of the Government.

In this crowding religious practices upon the Government, and upon the people by governmental power, the ecclesiastical managers find it "a very wholesome doctrine, and one very full of comfort," that from a decision of the Supreme Court there is no appeal,—that a "Supreme Court decision is a 'Thus saith the Lord.'"

As stated by a Catholic priest, as illustrating the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, it stands thus:—

"It is strange that a rule which requires a Supreme Court to give final decisions on disputed points in our Constitution, should be abused and slandered when employed by the Catholic Church. Citizens and others may read the Constitution, but they are not allowed to interpret it for themselves, but must submit to the interpretation given by the Superior [Supreme(?)] Court. The Bible is the constitution of the Catholic Church, and while all are exhorted to read this divine constitution, the interpretation of its true meaning must be left to the superior court of the church founded by Christ. The decision of our Federal Supreme Court is final; the decision

of the superior court of the church is final also, and, in virtue of the divine prerogative of inerrancy granted the church, infallible. The church has not, does not, and cannot, permit the violation of God's commandments in any case whatever."—*Reported in Catholic Mirror, March 2, 1895.*

The professed Protestantism of the country, is, if anything, more zealous than is Catholicism in the advocacy of this doctrine. And both alike are greatly pleased to find eminent "statesmen" insisting with all their power and influence upon the same doctrine.

All these vast influences are steadily and rapidly molding public sentiment into the fixed doctrine that Supreme Court decisions on constitutional questions are to be accepted *because* they are such decisions, without any question as to whether they are right or wrong—as soon as a decision has been made and because it has been made, it is a governmental and national Thus saith the Lord.

Public sentiment is thus being prepared so to accept any decision that may come from that source. And thus the way is surely being paved for the establishment of a national religious despotism. By repudiating that doctrine, Abraham Lincoln succeeded in averting the establishment of a national civil despotism. And nothing but the repudiation of that doctrine again, by the whole people, can avert the establishment of a national religious despotism. Yet for this, it must be confessed the evil has already spread too far; and it is too late to avert it.

A Mythical Alliance.

THE State Superintendent of the Nevada Christian Endeavor Society, Rev. Francis L. Nash, states in the *Christian Endeavorer* for February, 1897, that an alliance exists in Nevada between Seventh-day Adventists and the saloon. Here are his words;—

"The saloons and gambling hells make more money on that day [Sunday] than on all the other days of the week, and whenever an attempt is made to rescue the Sabbath, the Seventh-day Adventists stand in with the saloon men and do their best to stamp out the very last vestige of respect and reverence for the day which ought to be loved and honored. As a result, in many places the day is dreaded by the wives and mothers as the worst day in the week—the day for drinking, carousing, and horse racing, a day for fights and brawls, rioting and murder, heaven-daring impiety and beastly impurity."

And upon this the editor of the *Endeavorer* comments:—

"We are very sorry that this course should be pursued by these people, and hope that in the near future such an alliance of saloon-keepers and Seventh-day Adventists will be unknown."

All this reminds us of the familiar saying, "Important if true." But is it true?

We never heard of any alliance between seventh-day observers and saloonists, from either of the parties themselves. All talk of such a thing has come from other sources.

It is pretty certain that liquor dealers have had no suspicion that they have allies in the Seventh-day Adventists. About the last thing in the world that saloon men would want is a universal acceptance of Seventh-day Adventist doctrine on the subject of temperance.

Reason: Seventh-day Adventists use no intoxicants. In their communion there are neither drunkards nor moderate drinkers. And no saloon-keeper has ever thought of applying for membership in one of their churches. Does this indicate an alliance with the saloon?

More than this: Seventh-day Adventists are, and always have been, prohibitionists. Their literature proves this. We never knew liquor dealers to regard prohibitionists as their allies.

It is true, this religious body are the advocates of the seventh-day as being the Bible Sabbath, and are uncompromisingly opposed to the doctrine that the Sabbath is Sunday. And they are not backward in proclaiming these views, for they believe them to be part of a divine message which must go to the world. But does this constitute an alliance with the saloon? We think not.

And now a glance at the record of those who are publishing this "alliance," by way of comparison. What is their attitude toward the saloon?

Who are the ones that are advocating and working for a law to close all the saloons—*on Sundays?* Are they Seventh-day Adventists? No; they are the people represented by the *Endeavorer*. They would have a law closing saloons on Sunday, and allowing them to run the other six days of the week. And thus they would make of the saloon—that iniquitous thing—a *law-abiding institution*, wherever it would be willing to close its doors on Sunday; and this it is showing itself quite willing to do. It matters not that the Endeavorers desire prohibition, as we fully believe, and have that as their ultimate aim. What they and Sunday advocates generally are actually working for now is *the establishment of the saloon by law;* for that is what Sunday prohibition means. Seventh-day Adventists regard the saloon as by nature an outlaw.

It will be a good day for the saloon, and a bad day for the cause of temperance, when that evil institution shall be established in our land by a law which rests upon the will of the (professedly) Christian Church.

The saloon wants nothing better than the opportunity to say, I am a law-abiding institution; I am respectable, for I keep Sunday.

Where then is the real alliance, if there be one, between church people and the saloon? Is it to be found with the advocates of the seventh day or of the first?

Finally, it may be mentioned that in 1893 the saloonists of Chicago joined heartily in the plea of the Church people that the World's Fair be closed on Sundays. Of course this constituted no real alliance between the saloon and the Church. The saloon would be better patronized on Sunday with the Fair closed, and it would

be both business and good policy on its part to join in the petition. But there was just as much of an alliance as exists between the saloon and the Adventists.

The "alliance" of this people with the saloon is a myth.

The Object of Civil Government.

BY H. E. GIDDINGS.

THE employment of physical power in self-defense, and in governing others, is wholly an artificial use of this gift. Physical power is God-given at creation; and so is natural, and was appointed to natural and satisfactory ends. The Creator endowed man with intelligence to enable him to control the lower orders of creation; the genius of self-control; and the faculty and physical power to pursue happiness. But sin entered, turning the natural endowments of man into unlawful channels. The race multiplied with men in possession of all their natural rights and powers; but with the inclination to use them wrong, and in selfishness refuse to allow them to others.

Self-defense and civil government, therefore, became artificial necessities. The genius of government, which was of God to the individual that he might govern himself, was now employed to form a system to control those who had lost the power of self-government. The physical power given to enable man to improve the earth and pursue happiness, must now be employed to hold in check the vicious, to secure to as many as possible the enjoyment of their natural rights.

What, then, is delegated to government by the consent of the governed? *Power.* What kind of power? Physical power.

And this physical power given to man to be employed in other ways, in the pursuit of happiness, is largely consumed by being hurled against the vicious, in the form of police force and armies.

To sum up, all must agree that each political citizen is a factor in the government exercising sovereignty; that all the responsibility of government rests alike on each member; and that each person occupying this position does so by consent. Each consents to the form of administration, the payment of its expenses, the choosing and payment of officers to do the business, and they agree to furnish the power needed to make it all effective.

All the power of civil government is simply physical power, given by the Creator originally for other purposes. The principle of civil government is derived from the genius of self-government, which the Creator implanted in the individual.

Government, *as we have it,* is an artificial necessity, and not a natural provision of the Creator. The powers that be were originally ordained of God in the individual to keep him in harmony with the right; but sin having made inroads into this arrangement, the same power is now employed by outward means to control those who refuse to recognize order within themselves: or who have entirely lost the genius of controlling themselves from within and now must be controled by others from without.

It is the power that is in the persons by nature, that was ordained of God; and not the persons in power, nor the measures which they may adopt in the use of that power. It has more often occurred that men have made a wrong use of the power, than otherwise.

Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, was using this power when he compelled all to worship a false God, and attempted to destroy those who were true to the Creator; but this was a wrong use of the power. And God showed him that He did not approve of such a use of the power. When Pilate gave sentence against Christ he was using the power; but not properly.

All bad statutes and all injustice in all ages have been due to a wrong use of the right power. The power was ordained to perpetuate a condition of peace and happiness by the observance of the divinely implanted principle of self-control which was in the heart of each person. In this way, originally, each was *his own government,* and perfect peace prevailed with no expense or cost of life, money, or labor. No organized effort was needed: there was no place for any such thing.

When men lost from their hearts this divine principle and power of self-government, then in order to approach as near as possible to the conditions necessary to secure in an imperfect state, life and its blessings, they had to be governed from without by organized force, whose symbol is the sword.

With a "government of the people by the people and for the people" who compose it by consent, and give their power to it by consent, as well as assume all its responsibilities by consent, the question may well arise, Who is properly a citizen in this political sense? The responsibility is a grave one.

No Representatives in Religion.

THE members of the State and National legislatures are, as legislators, the representatives of the people. Representatives in what? In religion? No; certainly not. Then what can Congress or a State legislature properly have to do with religious affairs?

As individuals, legislators are like other men accountable to their Creator in all things; but they are not and cannot be accountable to God for other persons, for each individual must render his own account to God. He who expects to render his account or to settle it with God through a State legislature, or even through the Congress of the nation—if there be anyone so foolish—will find himself terribly mistaken in the day of reckoning.

Who is willing to be represented by another in religious faith and practice? Who is willing to make a member of his State legislature or of Congress his representative in religion? Who is willing to be bound in religion

by an act of any legislative body? Who will in the day of Judgment fall back with confidence upon such an act as valid authority for his own religious conduct?

The advocates of religious legislation say that legislators are like all other men, bound by the law of God; and so they are. But they are not so bound for other men, but only for themselves. Here is the vital point in the whole subject,—the point which the would-be reformers who are besieging our legislatures overlook or ignore. There can be no representative capacity in religion; and hence while each legislator is bound individually by the divine law, as representative of the people he has nothing to do with religious questions. He must confine himself to civil matters only.

This is not to say that he is to act against religion or against morality. The domain of things secular is not in any sense opposed to that of Christianity, any more than truth and justice in the one sphere are opposed to truth and justice in the other.

Legislators, like all other persons, may properly be urged to be obedient as individuals to the law of God. But to urge them to act thus for their constituents, as their representatives, is a different thing altogether. However righteous it may sound, or however necessary it may seem to be for the good of the country, in reality it is neither necessary nor righteous.

The Almighty will not recognize any arrangement by which one person is made to act for another in religion. Any such arrangement is in reality a heaven-daring piece of iniquity.

Legislators must simply refuse to deal as legislators with religious questions. Such matters must be settled in another way than by legislation. They must be left to the individual conscience and the Word of God.

A Long Felt Want.

THE February *Christian Endeavorer* contains the following:—

"Intense interest was caused by the publication, in the January *Christian Endeavorer*, of Rev. S. W. Gamble's discovery that 'the Jewish Sabbath was not Saturday, but was a movable one.' Letters have been pouring in to him and into this office from all over the land, expressing the thanks of the writers that this new theory has been made known. Lack of space prevents our publishing a tithe of the letters that have been received from leading men of every denomination."

Well, we have always thought there was a good deal of uneasiness and uncertainty in the camp of the Sunday forces regarding the genuineness of their sabbath, and now we know it. Their action in this case confesses it. The greeting accorded Mr. Gamble's "great discovery" by "leading men of every denomination," is that of something which supplies a long felt want. A dubious testimonial this, for all the argument which was supposed to furnish an abundant support to the Sunday sabbath heretofore!

And by this very fact, the Rev. Mr. Gamble's "discovery" has done more already to weaken the Sunday institution than it can ever do to sustain it. For erelong it will be found that this "discovery" is not what it seemed at first, and the long felt want will make itself more keenly felt by the adherents of tradition than ever before. These "great discoveries" which overthrow the Sabbath of the fourth commandment have been coming regularly for a long time, and they will continue to come with their accustomed frequency. But meanwhile the Sabbath, like Moses before the infidels, manages to keep right side up.

The Cold Wave in London, Ontario.

BY J. F. BALLENGER.

THE cold wave of "Christian Citizenship" is not confined to the States, but has crossed the Lakes and struck Canada with its chilling blast of "moral reform through political economy."

The Rev. Dr. E. O. Taylor, of Chicago, came to this city by invitation of the W. C. T. U. He spoke in the First Presbyterian Church last Sunday afternoon. He spent one hour in defining what "Christian Citizenship" is. We have heard and read a good deal of the aim and object of this movement, but we never heard or read anything in which the real character of this organization was unmasked as in the above lecture.

The speaker did not try to hide the fact that "Christian Citizenship" meant that the Church should run the State, as the following utterances will show. He said:—

"Human governments are divine, and God's ministers are appointed to administer in civil as well as religious things."

The apostles said, "But we will give ourselves continually to prayer and the ministry of the word." Acts 6:4.

Now if to administer civil governments means to minister the Word, then it follows that the minister must use the power of the civil government to enforce the Word.

This position was further defined by another statement, that—

"Every question, both civil and religious, should be settled by the book" [meaning the Bible].

Then it follows again, that the minister must define the terms of settlement according to the Bible, and when he has decided what the Bible says are the conditions of settlement, he must use the power of the State, which is the sword, to enforce a settlement.

Did pagan or papal Rome ever contend for any more than this? If they did we would like to be shown the page in history where it is recorded.

Again, the speaker said, "Remove the stumbling blocks out of the way of the Church and thus make it easy for man to do right by improving your civil laws."

We had always supposed that the gospel was the

power of God to enable men to do right by planting the righteousness of God in the heart through faith in Jesus Christ. Rom. 1:16, 17. We never once dreamed that it was in the power of civil law to remove the cross and make the straight and narrow way to heaven easy.

"Must I be carried to the skies
On flowery beds of ease,
Whilst others fought to win the prize
And sailed through bloody seas?"

Indeed, we can according to the above, just come and join the Christian Citizenship movement and improve our civil laws, and thus make it easy to do right by legislating away the cross. Then we will not need to be "crucified unto the world." We won't need to "suffer with Christ that we may reign with him." We shall need no longer to "watch and pray lest we enter into temptation," for temptations will be removed by improving civil law, and making it easy to do right. Then according to this proposed revolution we can all "live godly in Christ Jesus" without suffering persecution.

Once more; the speaker said:—

"Some people are very strict in attending to the ordinance of baptism and the sacrament, but neglect the ballot box. It is just as much our duty to vote as to pray or to take the sacrament."

Then the commission to preach the gospel should read, Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature, and he that believeth not and does not vote to help to improve the civil laws and make it easy to do right shall be damned!

How any man with an open Bible in his hand and the history of the past before him can put forth such reasoning is a mystery that we are not able to solve.

But such is the blindness of men when they "walk in the sparks of their own kindling." Were it not that the prophets have described and warned us against just such a state of things in the last days, we could hardly make ourselves believe that men could descend into such dense darkness.

Did we not read from the sacred page that there would be a union of religion and the State which would bring about the last great struggle between the powers of light and darkness, we could hardly believe our own ears as we listen to such sentiments as are put forth by these would-be reformers.

"*Watch* therefore: for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come."

London, Ont., Feb. 2.

THE National Reform party has now abandoned hope with reference to its so-called Christian Amendment to the Constitution, so far as concerns this session of Congress. After being so thoroughly disposed of before the hearing given by a committee of Congress last year, it was left in the hands of the committee without further action, and to a request recently preferred by its advocates for another hearing, reply was sent that no further discussion of the matter could be allowed. Of course it will make its appearance again before the new Congress.

THE extracts from the speeches of Lincoln and Douglas, presented in this paper, are taken from a volume entitled, "Political Speeches and Debates of Lincoln and Douglas." It is a book of 555 pages and is indispensable to every one who would understand the fundamental principles of the Government and the history of the country. Price, $1.50.

To every person who reads this number of the AMERICAN SENTINEL, we say, Please see that a copy of it is put into the hands of all your neighbors, and keep a copy for yourself for reference. It is needed by everybody now, and will be needed more, later on, and you will be glad if then you have it at hand.

MOSES ROSS, a resident of the District of Columbia, narrowly escaped being a victim of the old District law against profanity. He was convicted under the statute December 29, and sentenced to pay a fine of $20 and serve ninety days in the workhouse; but the President pardoned him.

TO OUR PATRONS:

1. Write *names plainly.*
2. Remit by P. O. Money Order, or Express Order, or by Bank Draft on New York. Personal checks are not desired.
3. Make all Orders and Drafts payable to Pacific Press Publishing Co., not to the editor or any other individual.
4. We will receive Postage Stamp in small quantities and any kind of good money. Defaced coins will not be taken. If paper money or coin is sent, register the letter.

☞ *Any one receiving the American Sentinel without having ordered it may know that it is sent to him by some friend. Therefore those who have not ordered the Sentinel need have no fears that they will be asked to pay for it.*

AMERICAN SENTINEL

Set for the defense of liberty of conscience, and therefore uncompromisingly opposed to anything tending toward a union of Church and State, either in name or in principle.

Published Weekly by Pacific Press Publishing Co.

ORGAN OF THE

International Religious Liberty Association.

(Entered at the New York Post-office.)

Single Copy, Per Year, - - - - $1.00.
" " Six months, - - - - - .50.
" " Three " - - - - - .25.

ADDRESS. **AMERICAN SENTINEL,**
39 Bond Street, New York.

That "Superb" Bible.

Dodgeville, Wis.

AMERICAN SENTINEL, New York City:

The Bible came to hand all right. To say that I am pleased with it will but faintly describe my feelings. It would take too much space to enumerate its many points of excellence, so I will sum it all up in the one word "superb."

There are so many "aids to the study of the Scriptures," and they are so helpful and just what I have been wishing for since I became a "Bible Christian."

Friends and neighbors all say, "I wish I had one like it," and "So cheap." Our seventeen-year-old daughter is about to start out to obtain subscriptions for the SENTINEL, as she wishes for one "just like it."

Please accept my warmest thanks, and believe me to be, Ever sincerely yours,

R. G. W. COLLINS.

[See advertisement on last page.]

$7.00 WORTH FOR $3.50.

We propose to make it possible for each and everyone to be the possessor of

A First-Class High Grade Bible.

The book we offer has large clear type (see specimen) and is what is known as the

AMERICAN OXFORD SELF-PRONOUNCING REFERENCE TEACHERS' BIBLE,

Bourgois Type, Bound in Imperial Seal Leather, Divinity Circuit, Extra Linen Lined to Edge, Round Corners, Red Under Gold Edges, Silk Headband, Silk Marker, Binding of the Best Quality,

They that sealed the covenant. NEHEMIAH, X. *The points of the covenant.*

gavest before them, neither turned they from their wicked works.
36 Behold, [d] we *are* servants this day, and *for* the land that thou gavest unto our fathers to eat the fruit thereof and the good thereof, behold, we *are* servants in it:
37 And [e] it yieldeth much increase

B. C. 445.

[d] Deut. 28. 48. Ezra 9. 9.

[e] Deut. 28.

25 Rē'hŭm, Hă-shăb'nah, Mā-a-sē'-jah,
26 And Ă-hī'jah, Hā'nan, Ā'nan,
27 Măl'luch, Hā'rim, Bā'a-nah.
28 ¶ [e] And the rest of the people, the priests, the Lē'vītes, the porters, the singers, the Nĕth'i-nĭms, [f] and all they that had separated themselves

SPECIMEN OF TYPE.



OUR PREMIUM BIBLE CLOSED.

REGULAR PRICE, $6.00

With this book reading is made easy. No more stumbling over the hard words. All proper names are divided into syllables, and the accent and diacritical marks render their accurate pronunciation a simple matter. With a little study of the Key to Pronunciation to be found in every copy of this Bible, the reader loses all fear of the long, hard names of Scripture, and pronounces them with ease.

WITH SENTINEL, ONE YEAR $3.50

As is indicated by the name, this is a teachers' Bible. It contains fifteen pages of illustrations and diagrams, copious helps of the latest revision, Bible index, concordance, dictionary of Scripture proper names with their pronunciation and meaning, and many other excellent features.

WHAT THEY SAY OF IT.

Wabash, Ind., Oct. 14, 1896.
AMERICAN SENTINEL: My Bible received this day, for which accept thanks. I am very well pleased. I think I have just what I need in the way of a Bible. It is not only a teacher's Bible, but also the very best for a student.
Yours truly,
T. M. MORRIS.

San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 15, 1896.
AMERICAN SENTINEL: I received my Bible, and am very much pleased with it. It is a first-class Bible; just what it is claimed to be.
MRS. E. F. NOBLE.

Brattleboro, Vt. Nov. 22, 1896.
AM very much pleased with it.
MRS. E. C. MILLARD.

Graettinger, Iowa, Nov. 30, 1896.
WE are all more than pleased with the Bible in every way. As a book it is thoroughly well made and elegant in all its parts. As a Bible the self-pronunciation is a new feature, and this is only one of its many excellencies. The type is a great delight to me.
MRS. S. M. OLESEN.

It is only by special arrangement with the publishers of this Bible that we are able to make this

UNPRECEDENTED OFFER.

REMEMBER, the price of this Bible is $6.00. Anyone, OLD OR NEW SUBSCRIBER, sending us $3.50 will receive this Bible postpaid, and the Sentinel one year.

We will GIVE one of these Superb Bibles for SEVEN new names at the regular subscription price, $7.00.

For 25 cents extra we will mark on the Bible in gold letters any name desired.

Address all orders to AMERICAN SENTINEL,
39 BOND STREET, NEW YORK.